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Abstract
In the last few years, research has been motivated to provide a categorization and classification of security concerns
accompanying the growing adaptation of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) clouds. Studies have been motivated by
the risks, threats and vulnerabilities imposed by the components within the environment and have provided general
classifications of related attacks, as well as the respective detection and mitigation mechanisms. Virtual Machine
Introspection (VMI) has been proven to be an effective tool for malware detection and analysis in virtualized
environments. In this paper, we classify attacks in IaaS cloud that can be investigated using VMI-based mechanisms.
This infers a special focus on attacks that directly involve Virtual Machines (VMs) deployed in an IaaS cloud. Our
classification methodology takes into consideration the source, target, and direction of the attacks. As each actor in a
cloud environment can be both source and target of attacks, the classification provides any cloud actor the necessary
knowledge of the different attacks by which it can threaten or be threatened, and consequently deploy adapted
VMI-based monitoring architectures. To highlight the relevance of attacks, we provide a statistical analysis of the
reported vulnerabilities exploited by the classified attacks and their financial impact on actual business processes.
Keywords: IaaS, Malware, VM, Classification
Introduction
The cloud computing market continues to grow with
spendings on public IaaS clouds having reached 38 bil-
lion U.S. dollars in 2016 [1]. Virtualization technology is
the key enabler for such computing infrastructure ser-
vices. Despite all advances in IT security in the past three
decades, recent statistics also indicate the growth of mal-
ware activities, with a record number of over 140 million
new malware samples detected in 2015 [2].
Over the years, many publications such as [3] have
presented comprehensive analysis of security threats, vul-
nerabilities, example incidents, and countermeasures in
IaaS cloud. While such reports provide a good overview
on the wide range of potential problems, few publications
specifically focus in-depth on the problem of malware
in the context of IaaS environments and virtualization
technology.
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Besides, VMI is a set of techniques that allow for the
inspection of VMs from outside the guest OS and the
analysis of the running programs inside of it. In the VMI
approach, the security monitoring software is isolated
from the monitored guest VMs [4]. This isolation ensures
both stealthiness and higher integrity of the diagnosis,
which encourages practitioners to bring VMI capabilities
into IaaS Cloud [5].
In this paper, we classify malware attacks in IaaS cloud
taking into consideration their origin and target among
the different actors in IaaS environments (see Fig. 1).
We give an overview of attacks by which each actor can
be threatened or with which it could harm other enti-
ties in the environment. To be able to deploy effective
VMI-basedmechanisms for analysis, monitoring or detec-
tion, in the IaaS cloud, it is necessary to have a knowl-
edge of existing virtualization-related attacks that can be
addressed using VMI. Therefore, we put a particular focus
on attacks which directly involve VMs.
Overall, our study provides insight into the threats
caused bymalware against IaaS environments. Our results
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Fig. 1 A generic cloud scenario showing every actor, namely the EE, the CP, and the VM, as source or target of attack. Dashed red arrows represent a
VM being a target and blue arrows represent a VM being source of attacks. Dotted arrows represent directions of attacks that do not involve VMs
can be used for targeting future research to develop and
enhance Security-as-a-Service offerings in public cloud
environments, and to raise awareness to any party will-
ing to get involved in a cloud scenario and use VMI-based
approaches as its security mechanisms against the differ-
ent existing attacks and threats. The paper is structured
as follows. Section “Related work” discusses related work
on classifying security issues, vulnerabilities, or attacks
in virtualized environments. We present our classifica-
tion methods in “Threat model” section and detail each
class in “Attacks outside of VM”, “VM as target of attacks”
and “VM as attack source” section. “Evaluation” section
presents our findings regarding the practical relevance of
the identified categories and the analysis of the focus of
related work. “Conclusion” section summarizes our work.
Related work
In literature, several surveys and classifications of cloud
computing security issues have been presented. They
include discussions from experts on the most signifi-
cant threats in industrial practices [6] and from academic
researchers on the risks and threats related to privacy,
confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability
that the nature of the cloud service models poses [7, 8].
Diogo et al. [9] discuss the service delivery models (IaaS,
Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS))
of the cloud and the deployment models (public, private,
hybrid, community, virtual private cloud). They also dis-
cuss the features that cloud computing offers but which
may introduce security vulnerabilities. These are the vir-
tualization capabilities, the multi-tenancy nature of the
cloud, the trust and the standardization. Alongside the
state-of-the-art of security issues in the cloud, the authors
also propose a taxonomy of attacks, threats and vulner-
abilities of relevant cloud components: software, storage
and computing, virtualization, Internet and services, net-
work, access, trust, and compliance and legality.
Huang et al. [10] survey the security issues in public IaaS
clouds. The authors present a comparison between the
perspectives of industry and academia, and demonstrate
how industry deals with threats in IaaS cloud and how
researches consider solutions related to IaaS computing
and storage. The authors classify attacks based on two
relevant security threats which they have identified:
threats from a malicious cloud service provider, and from
the clients.
Modi et al. [11] outline several vulnerabilities that are
relevant to cloud environments, such as those concerning
virtualization, Internet protocols, or unauthorized access
to the management interface. They also discuss the poten-
tial effects of their exploitation. Furthermore, the threats
are discussed according to affected cloud services and
possible solutions. The corresponding attack types which
jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
cloud resources, are listed together with their effects and
mitigation solutions. Finally, the discussed security issues
are classified with respect to the different levels in the
cloud infrastructure that they affect.
Khalil et al. [12] identify 28 security issues arising
in cloud computing environments and group those into
five categories: security standards, network, access con-
trol, cloud infrastructure, and data. Correspondingly, nine
known attack groups have been defined, such as Denial-
of-Service (DoS), cloud malware injection, and cross-VM
side channels. The countermeasures to the presented
attacks have been discussed and evaluated. Additionally,
the authors provide an overview of the previous research
in the field of cloud computing security.
Ardagna et al. [13] present a wide overview and clas-
sification of 306 scientific publications addressing vul-
nerabilities, threats, attacks in clouds and corresponding
solutions, classified in different levels: application, tenant-
on-tenant, and provider-on-tenant/tenant-on-provider.
Their classification considered security properties: confi-
dentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, and privacy.
Beyond the discussion of security issues, the authors
also define security assurance as a broader term embrac-
ing methodologies for collecting and validating evidences
that support security properties. The security assur-
ance techniques considered in surveyed publications have
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been classified into testing, monitoring, certification,
audit/compliance, and Service Level Agreement (SLA).
Each work that deals with the study of malware and
attacks in the cloud also provides recommendations for
future research topics including and the design of security
solutions, that are mostly based on traditional deploy-
ments such as in-guest Intrusion Detection System (IDS),
in which the security monitoring agent runs on the
component to be monitored. One disadvantage of in-
guest deployment is that if the host operating system
is tampered (e.g. with rootkit), the monitoring software
becomes vulnerable and, therefore, it might not reliably
return correct diagnosis.
Garfinkel et al. [4] introduce the VMI-based intrusion
detection architecture in which the monitoring agent is
pulled outside the monitored VM. The VMI IDS ana-
lyzes machine states and events through the Virtual
Machine Monitor (VMM) interface. It leverages the iso-
lation, inspection, and interposition properties of the
VMM. Isolation protects the VMI IDS from being tam-
pered even if the monitored VM is corrupted. Inspection
and interposition properties give the VMI IDS the capa-
bilities to inspect all states of hosted VMs and notify the
user about any change or suspicious behavior. Advantages
of VMI IDS are better integrity of the diagnosis compared
to in-guest mechanisms and stealthiness of the monitor-
ing system as the introspection can be performed without
the introspected VM being aware of it.
The Garfinkel et al. work has been followed by various
attempts to bring VMI to the IaaS cloud environments.
Baek et al. [14] have developed CloudVMI which aims at
bringing VMI functionality to cloud users. CloudVMI vir-
tualizes the VMI interface by wrapping the Remote Pro-
cedure Calls (RPCs) of the introspection library LibVMI1.
Zach et al. [15] have extended the Application Program-
ming Interface (API) of the cloud management system
functions to analyze running VMs. LiveCloudInspector
provides users functionalities such as taking main mem-
ory snapshots and executing volatility scripts to inspect
their VMs.
In summary, the related works analyze the different pos-
sible malware attacks that might target an IaaS cloud and
provide the different mitigation methodologies that can
be adopted. In our work, we classify malware attacks in
IaaS clouds based on the attack direction, i.e. the origin
or target of the attacks. Moreover, we take into consid-
eration the promising advantages of VMI-based security
monitoring mechanisms. Therefore, we focus on attacks
which directly involve VMs as a source or target. This
direction-based classification allows different actors in a
cloud scenario to assess the different malware attacks by
which they could be threatened or might threaten other
actors in the cloud, and consequently design the adequate
VMI-based detection and mitigation mechanisms.
Threat model
We define a generic IaaS cloud scenario as the set of the
following three distinct actors:
• Cloud provider (CP) : hosts the hardware and
infrastructure, to which it has a physical access.
Provider’s tasks include the VMs deployment and
system maintenance.
• External entity (EE) : can be a customer or
non-customer2. A cloud customer or tenant rents,
uses, and manages the VMs allocated by the cloud
provider according to the contracted terms of a
service agreement.
• Virtual machine (VM) : is instantiated at the provider
side upon request from a registered external entity.
The conditions of VMs deployment follow a
contracted agreement between a cloud provider and
a customer. The VMs host the customer’s services,
and applications.
Several reasons put the VMs under the focus of our
analysis and classification:
• In the IaaS cloud model, the known reasons behind
the adoption and migration to the cloud by the users
include mainly the unlimited and on-demand
computational capabilities of VMs.
• Moreover, VMs host user’s application ranging from
daily calculation software to critical services. This
makes the VMs critical components in this service
model. The security of VMs has been addressed by
many research works in virtualization, by leveraging
traditional monitoring mechanisms at network,
application, system and hardware level.
• The use of VMI-based mechanisms for security
monitoring of VMs is an emerging and promising
approach that has motivated research works in
finding adequate heuristics that best fit users’ needs
and bringing its capabilities as a service in IaaS Cloud.
With leveraged access control, the security
monitoring of VMs can benefit from the advantages
of the VMI-based techniques such as isolation and
stealthiness of the monitoring agent [5].
Figure 1 sketches our classification and the interaction
between entities in our classification. Our analysis aims
at providing the necessary knowledge about attacks and
threats surrounding each actor in a generic cloud sce-
nario. To support future research in designing adequate
VMI-based architectures, attacks that can be investigated
using VMI-based mechanisms, therefore directly involv-
ing VMs, are specially covered. As Fig. 1 shows, the class of
attacks between an external entity and the cloud provider
(dashed line) does not involve VMs.
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Attack classes
We distinguish the following classes of attacks:
• Class 1: attacks in which the malicious activities take
place outside VMs.
• Class 2: attacks targeting a VM. These are attacks
that let the attacker gain control over a VM or bring a
malicious VM into the environment.
• Class 3: attacks originating from a VM, carried out by
malware running in a VM.
We detail each class of attacks in the following sections
and provide the relevant categories and taxonomy. In a
general consideration, attacks from and to external entity
apply to both client and non-client of the cloud, unless
mentioned when distinction is necessary. Each analysis
is summarized in a table with the attacks’ source in the
vertical dimension and target in the horizontal dimension.
Attacks outside of VM
In this category, we include malicious activities that nei-
ther originate from a VM nor aim at infecting a VM with
malware. A unique characteristic of attacks in this cate-
gory is the impossibility to detect them with mechanisms
that externally monitor VMs.
EE as source of attacks
In this subsection, we consider different attacks originat-
ing from malicious external entities and targeting cloud
users or the cloud provider. We distinguish between mali-
cious cloud customers and non-customers. In fact, certain
attacks can be only realized when the attacker has access
to services or resources only available to registered clients.
From EE cloud customers. By overusing its allocated
resources, a customer can degrade the service quality
of other clients in the same cloud sector and eventu-
ally prevent others from accessing their critical resources
[16]. A reported case describes a malicious customer
creating forwarding loops inside one Content Delivery
Network(CDN) or across multiple CDNs [17]. Such for-
warding loops caused one request to be processed repeat-
edly or even indefinitely, resulting in undesired resource
consumption and potential DoS attacks.
From EE customers or non-customers. The Cloud
Security Alliance (CSA) has listed the 12 cloud comput-
ing top threats of 2016 [18] to support cloud customers
and providers in building their defenses methodologies.
According to the report, traditional access and man-
agement of the computation infrastructures through
dedicated APIs, or software and the usage of registered
accounts are attractive for attackers. Users’ accounts are
targets of phishing, fraud, and credential theft attacks.
Additionally, software vulnerabilities and API miscon-
figuration can also be exploited by attackers. These give
enough power to control a user’s virtual infrastructure,
lead further activities at the user’s expense, or expose
cloud user’s data at risk [16, 19]. Social engineering also
need to be properly handled as it helps attackers collect
valuable information from users or trigger them into
manipulating their cloud services by providing a false
alarming information.
Attacks targeting the cloud provider do not directly
(or not necessarily) harm the VMs, but first tamper
with the functionality of the cloud management system.
Design flaws in the management stack can help an exter-
nal attacker to infer information about the virtualized
environment, execute unauthorized arbitrary commands
at the cloud management, or perform a DoS attack, for
instance when exploiting vulnerabilities such as described
in CVE-2015-18423 Fig. 2.
CP as source of attacks
In this subsection, we consider attacks originating from
the cloud provider and targeting cloud users or the cloud
provider.
Fig. 2 CVE entries for the three classes of attacks
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The cloud customers and provider can also be target of
malicious activities or misbehavior from certain employ-
ees also called malicious insiders. The The Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT) defines a malicious
insider as "a (former) employee, contractor or business
partner who has or had authorized access to an organiza-
tion’s network system or data and intentionally exceeded
or misused that access in a manner that negatively affected
the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organi-
zation’s information or information systems" [20]. Accord-
ing to [16], in 2014, 8% of reported cases of data breaches,
data theft and illegitimate modification in public clouds
were the results of insider theft conducted by malicious
administrators who could directly access to customer’s
data. Even if the cloud services feature data encryption,
malicious insiders still can access the private keys when
they are stored on provider’s storage components [20].
Additional harm by malicious insider includes tarnish-
ing the company’s reputation [18] that is considerably
dependent on its public image, the clients’ satisfaction on
the delivered services, costs and security aspects [21].
A summary of the class of attacks that take place out-
side the VMs is given in Table 1. An external entity can be
attacked by both customer and external adversary. Attacks
that necessarily require the attackers to be a registered
cloud customers are in bold font.
VM as target of attacks
In this category, we discuss malware attacks that target
VMs in a cloud environment. The malicious activities
attempt to corrupt a VM (bringing malware in a VM as an
objective of the attack) or morph it to behave maliciously
towards its owner or environment (attack serving mainly
Table 1 Class 1: Attacks taking place outside of VMs, entries in
bold require the adversary to be a registered cloud customer
Source Target

















Virtual Machine - - -
Cloud Provider Data breach - Malicious insider
Data theft
Data modification
as an intermediate stage to a more complex attack). In
both cases, attacks in this class may originate from both
external entities or from the cloud provider.
From external entities
Compromised repositories. A repository is a service
that allows users and provider to store the VM templates
or images. These are prepackaged software containing the
configurations files that are used to create VMs. Secur-
ing the VM repository is the responsibility of the provider
while securing the VMs is that of the customer [22].
Injecting malware into a VM image repository is a way
of bringing malicious VMs into the cloud. Infected VMs
are intentionally uploaded to the repository by malicious
users who upload images containing malware, or unin-
tentionally by non-malicious users who upload misconfig-
ured templates. In general, only registered customers have
the rights to upload VM templates.
Repositories containing infected images are also called
bad repositories [23]. They pose challenging issues to
cloud users and providers. In fact, the sharing of images
becomes a threat as anyone who retrieves themwill initial-
ize compromised VMs, introducing vulnerabilities to his
infrastructure and eventually to the cloud environment.
Co-location. In co-location attacks, an attacker aims at
locating the host on which a target VM is deployed and
placing his VM on the same host as the victim VM.
Co-locations usually constitutes a prerequisite for other
attacks such as cross-VM side-channel attacks. In general,
an attacker might:
• exploit the weaknesses in VM placement algorithms
and the lack of location privacy in cloud environments
to gain and verify co-location. Using network-based
methods, internal IP addresses assigned to instances
can be mapped to availability zones and instance
types, as described by the case-study for Amazon’s
Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) [24].
• profile the service provided by the target, such as
en-/decryption. By observing cache usage patters, it
becomes possible to verify co-location with a
certainty of 50% in the worst case and up to 90% in
the best case [25].
• access a metered rack Power Distribution Unit (PDU)
[26], a common hardware in data centers to monitor
the power consumption. Using Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) to access the PDU,
the attacker can introduce varying load to the target
VM to identify the server on which the target resides.
Attacks on migrated VMs. One of the main features of
IaaS clouds is the live migration of VMs in which a run-
ning VM ismoved to another server with the least possible
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interruption. Live migration improves the flexibility of
the virtual environment and allows the provider to keep
the VM running with the required performance when
the original host is overloaded or has to be isolated for
maintenance or because of an error or attack. Live migra-
tion can also be utilized for improving the operating costs
(e.g. energy) by consolidating VM. The security challenges
in the cloud are more serious when migration is used,
in particular if migration is performed between different
widely distributed data centers [27]. Two main threats are
imposed by live migration: the exploitation of the migra-
tion itself (see Section “Exploiting live migration”), and
attacks on the customer VMs duringmigration. In the sec-
ond threat, the migrated VMs might face different attacks
such as man-in-the-middle, DoS and stack over-flow [28].
These attacks can be either active attacks that change the
migrated data or passive attacks that perform an eaves-
dropping on the VM to extract sensitive data such as
passwords [29]. Othermigration data such as kernelmem-
ory, application state, and keys might also be sniffed or
tampered if transmitted without encryption, thus com-
promising the integrity and confidentiality of the VM
data [28].
Attacks on hosted applications. These attacks are con-
sidered in our classification because VMs might also
host services that are publicly accessible. However, such
attacks are not exclusive to cloud. Known attacks are
for instance: SQL injection, buffer overflow, flooding
and browser attacks. An attacker’s goal is to tamper
with the application hinder the VM to properly deliver
its services.
From cloud provider
This category of attacks from the cloud provider targeting
VMs is referred to as malicious insider. In our analysis, we
limit the objective of the malicious insider to owning the
infrastructure or gaining customer’s confidential informa-
tion contained in the VMs. However, even if owning the
cloud infrastructure is not the final objective, having con-
trol on it is a necessary step to have enough capabilities to
lead further damaging attacks.
Potential attack scenarios are:
• Analyzing the memory dump of targeted VM to find
clear text password using a hypervisor specific
command or extract user private key using tools like
rsakeyfind [30].
• Accessing the victim’s disk partition in order to
extract confidential information from its active
logical volumes [30].
• Performing cold boot attacks or tampering the
hardware to which the insider has access [31].
• Exploiting flaws in the integrity-protection
mechanisms of the hypervisor to divert a victim VM
to a machine under his control using the basic
relocation functionality [30, 31].
• Using VMI-based inspection techniques to illegally
extract any information from a target VM [32].
Hyperjacking A hyperjacking attack tries to take con-
trol of the hypervisor that manages the virtual environ-
ment. This is possible when attacker injects an hypervisor
beneath the original one, or has direct access to the origi-
nal hypervisor. Hijacking an Operating System (OS) using
a hypervisor is associated to the emergence of VM-based
rootkit (VMBR) with Subvirt, Vitriol and Blue Pill as illus-
trating proof-of-concepts [33].When the target is the host
OS, hyperjacking becomes a serious attack as once the
hypervisor is owned, attacker can take full control of the
environment, and use any guest OS as a staging ground to
attack other guests.
A direct consequence of VMBR and the hyperjacking
attack on VMs is the complete control of the machines.
The malicious hypervisor has the required privileges to
subvert the behavior of a VM, hence causing a partial com-
promise (when it leaks sensitive information about the
VM) or a total compromise (when it executes arbitrary
code on the host with a VMM process privilege or serves
as a staging ground to attack other VMs) [34].
VM theft. In this attack, an attacker copies a VM over the
network or to a portable storage media in order to mount
and run it elsewhere [35]. However, an attacker might also
manipulate the control panel of VMM that manages live
migration, in order to initiate unauthorized migration of
guest VM to his own cloud infrastructure [36].
Table 2 summarizes the class of attacks by which VMs
are targeted in IaaS cloud environment. For attacks which
originate from other VMs we refer the reader to Table 3.
Table 2 Class 2: Attacks targeting VMs
Source Target
External Entity Virtual machine Cloud Provider





Virtual Machine - (see Table 3)
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Table 3 Class 3: Attacks originating from VMs
Source Target
External Entity Virtual machine Cloud Provider
External Entity - - -
Virtual Machine Botnet Net. spoofing/sniffing Attacks on hypervisor
Spaming DoS attacks VM escape
Resource overuse Side channel Hypercall attack
Anti-VMI attack Exploiting live migration (DoS) DoS attacks
Split-personality Exploiting live migration (DoS)
Cloud Provider - - -
VM as attack source
In this category, we describe the behavior of malware
within a VM. In the same way as on a physical host,
malware can run in a cloud VM and perform attacks
against external entities outside the cloud, such as running
a botnet that attacks third parties by DoS attacks, send-
ing spam, trying to exploit other external vulnerabili-
ties. Similarly, the Malware could just excessively use the
resources and cause large cost for the owner of the VM.
Such attacks are not exclusive to cloud environments. In
our analysis, we distinguish three possibilities of malware
behavior:
• Malware that attack other (co-located) VMs
(inter-VM attacks),
• Malware that attack the hosting hypervisor in the
cloud infrastructure.
• Malware that hinder legitimate introspection actions
on user’s VMs.
Inter-VM Attacks
Inter-VM attacks are launched from one VM to another
co-residing VM through shared memory, network con-
nections, and other shared resources without compro-
mising the hypervisor layer. Such attacks are potentially
damaging as once a VM in a cluster is compromised,
other VMs becomemore vulnerable [37].We highlight the
following attacks:
Virtual network sniffing/spoofing. In the virtualized
environment, the bridge mode, by which VM share a vir-
tual hub to communicate, allows the guests to sniff each
others’ traffic. The route mode, in which a virtual switch
connects each VM, allows malicious VM(s) to perform
an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache poisoning to
redirect packets to or from other guests [38].
Denial-of-Service attacks. Inter-VM communication
mechanisms targeting high-efficiency by design might
sacrifice certain level of security and security requirement,
hence exposing the hosts to inter-Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) attacks that exploit weak authentication
mechanisms in the inter-VM communication [37]. Simi-
larly to DoS attacks, shared-resource consumption attacks
hinder other customers’ VMs and hinder the VM from
delivering hosted services.
Cross-VM side channel attacks. The isolation between
co-residing VMs belonging to different customers is a
critical security problem in IaaS. When an attacker suc-
ceeds to place his VM in the same host as the victim VM,
for example through co-location attack (see Sect. 4), a
weak implementation of the isolation mechanisms allows
a malicious VM to perform sophisticated side-channel
attacks by monitoring the computing resources of the
host. To the best of our knowledge, most of the researches
about cross-VM side-channel attacks focus on memory-
and cache- based side-channels, since memory and cache
are shared between VMs on the same host and hold
easily accessible run-time data of VMs. The most known
attacks are:
• Prime and Probe attack. Prime and probe attack
operates in three steps. In the Prime phase, the
attacker fills a portion of the cache with his data. In
the Trigger phase, the attacker waits for the victim to
access the memory. In the Probe phase, the attacker
measures the time of memory access. If it is higher
than a certain threshold, the accessed memory page is
not cached anymore. Therefore, a memory page
associated with a certain cache line was accessed by
the victim (or other VMs). Such attacks have been
shown to recover a full 2048 bit
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) key in Amazon [39].
• Flush/Reload Attack.Memory deduplication is a
memory utilization optimization technique
introduced by Bugnion et al. [40]. It seeks for
memory pages with the same content and merges
them to one physical memory page. Merged memory
pages are tagged as read-only to prevent one owner
from modifying them. If the page needs to be
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modified, its modified version is stored in another
memory page called Copy-On-Write (CoW).
In a cross-VM scenario, by adding a detection step
for running encryptions, a full AES key could be
recovered by observing only 30,000 encryptions for
the fully asynchronous attack and 10,000 for the
semi-asynchronous attack [41].
Exploiting live migration. An example of such attacks
is forcing the cloud management system to create many
migrations, leading to a DoS attack on the VMs and the
involved hosts. This can be done for example by vary-
ing the resource usages of a malicious VM to trigger live
migration [42]. Another example is using a fake migration
to inject a malicious VM into a host to perform VM-
escape (see Section “VM-escape”) or side-channel attacks
against the host and other VMs respectively.
Attacks on the Hypervisor
In virtualized environments, hypervisors are not safe from
malicious VMs: 71.2% of all Xen and 65.8% of all KVM
vulnerabilities could be exploited by a guest VM. The
study in [43] has demonstrated how Xen’s memory is
hijacked from the Dom0 domain. A CPU testing method
has uncovered 117 bugs on the Linux KVM hypervisor,
which introduced security vulnerabilities to the VMs, and
flaws in Intel virtualization technology that cause an dif-
ferences in the observable behavior of code running on
virtual and bare-metal servers [44]. In the following, we
describe attacks targeting the hypervisor.
VM-escape. VM escape is an exploitation by which a
malware running in a VM bypasses the isolation between
the host and VMs and interacts directly with the hyper-
visor. This provides the attacker a root privilege, access
to the host OS, and possibly full control over the
environment.
For example, Virtunoid [45] is a functional guest-to-
host privilege escalation attack against KVM that exploits
the CVE-2011-17514 bug. Another example of exploitable
vulnerability for VM escape attack is described by the
CVE-2008-0923 vulnerability which allows guests in some
VMware products to write arbitrary file in the guest OS.
Hypercall attacks. Hypercall attacks consist of an intru-
sion by a malicious guest VM to the VM using well-
defined hypercall interfaces and exploiting vulnerabilities
in a VMM’s hypercall handler [46]. Such attacks might
lead to an alteration of the VMM’s functionalities or
“host crash”, upon the execution of a malicious code with
VMM privileges. Recent exploitable vulnerabilities of the
Xen hypervisor, enabling hypercall attacks, are detailed
in the CVE-2015-7812, CVE-2015-4163, CVE-2015-4164
and CVE-2015-2752 records.
Denial-of-service (DoS) attack. In DoS attacks against
the hypervisor, attackers aim at utilizing high amount
of resources that is enough to considerably degrade the
performance of the environment, by leveraging the hyper-
visor’s misconfiguration or design flaws [47]. One example
by Zhou et al. [48] consists of manipulating the hyper-
visor’s scheduling mechanisms by a malicious guest to
obtain up to 98% of total CPU cycles.
Anti-VMI Attacks
“VMI is a powerful technique for determining the spe-
cific aspects of guest VM execution from outside” [49].
In IaaS environments, VMI allows a user to run intru-
sion detection or necessary monitoring actions to keep his
VMs secure and running properly. The monitoring tools
analyze the kernel data structure of the monitored VM.
Hence, a malware injected into a vulnerable guest ker-
nel running in a VM might subvert an introspection tool
and its analysis, if it succeeds to effectively manipulate
the kernel data structure by adding or removing certain
field of the data structure, changing its semantic, or both
simultaneously [49].
Another method of anti-VMI attacks is split person-
ality malware, in which a malware analyzes the envi-
ronment in which it is running, and when detecting a
virtualized environment, it runs only harmless code and
behaves in a benign manner escaping detection [50].
Table 3 summarizes the class of malware attacks which
originate from a VM and target the different actors of an
IaaS cloud.
Evaluation
In this section, we consider several aspects of the classi-
fied malware attacks that involve VMs. Our objective is
to help a (future) user of IaaS to have a general under-
standing of relevant security aspects and purpose of the
attacks threatening his infrastructure, so that adequate
VMI-based mitigation mechanisms can be designed.
First, we summarize the different characteristics of the
classified attacks in terms of attack complexity, secu-
rity impact and proposed defense measurements in the
literature. Then, we analyze the statistics about the virtu-
alization vulnerabilities exploited by the attacks, reported
in publicly disclosed databases, and highlight their evo-
lution in the course of time. Finally, we present the eco-
nomic impact that attacks had andmight have on business
processes.
Attacks characteristics
Our classification focuses on attacks which directly
involve VMs as source and target. Such attacks can be
mitigated using VMI-based mechanisms. In Table 4, we
summarize the VM attacks by presenting their relevant
characteristics which are described as follows:
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Table 4 Characterization of the different attacks originating from VMs
Attacks Impact Detectability Countermeasures Complx. Ref.
Network-based C/A E: Net. monitoring Secure channel (encryption) Low [38, 55]
VM-DoS A E: Net. monitoring QoS management Low [37]
Cache side-channels C D: heuristics andcode, RTSC Static & dynamic page coloring High [56]
Mem. deduplication side-Channels C D: heuristics andcode, RTSC Fuzzy timers High [40, 57]
Co-residency detection none D: Attack specific Unresolved problem Low [24]
VM Escape C/A/I Unresolved problem Patching, software engineering formal verification Low/Med. [45, 46]
Hypervisor-DoS A E: Availability monitoring Good isolation Low [58–60]
Hypervisor info. Gain C D/unresolved Good isolation Low [43]
Anti-VMI Attacks none Unresolved problem Difficult: Attack specific Medium [49, 50]
• Impact: if upon success of the attacks, an attacker
consequently gains information to which he should
not have access, executes malicious codes or modifies
the legitimate functionalities of the system, or
hinders the victim to deliver expected services, then
the attacks have a direct impact on confidentiality
(C), integrity (I), or availability (A), respectively.
• Detectability: defines the difficulty to detect the
attacks, ranging from easy (E) to difficult (D), and the
deployed methods to detect the attacks.
• Countermeasures: enumerates existing techniques to
mitigate the attacks.
• Complexity: defines the difficulties faced by an
attacker when performing the attacks ranging from
low, medium to high.
• References: enumerates referenced works that detail
the characterized attacks.
Table 4 describes how the VM attacks are addressed
in literature. Major countermeasures deal with attacks
by tackling the vulnerabilities in the design or construc-
tion of virtualization components such as hypervisors. In
Section “Attacks and Vulnerability Reports”, we present a
statistical analysis of the vulnerabilities in most popular
hypervisors.
Attacks and Vulnerability Reports
Hypervisor, the key enabler of IaaS cloud virtualization,
can also be a single point of failure [37]. Most damag-
ing threats to a cloud platform take benefits of hyper-
visor vulnerabilities. In the following, we analyze the
vulnerabilities of most popular hypervisors in data cen-
ters (Xen, KVM) [43] and OpenStack virtualization core
components from the perspective of publicly disclosed
vulnerabilities. Our directive is as follows:
• To eliminate duplication, we focus on CVE details
(http://www.cvedetails.com/) in which a unique
identifier is assigned to each vulnerability report.
• We considered entries that describe the
vulnerabilities exploited by the attacks in our
classification.
We consulted a total of 185 reports (Xen (159), KVM
(8), OpenStack (18)) associated to our classes of attacks,
listed in Section “Attack classes”. Among the reports,
12,98% relate to vulnerabilities that allow attacks in class
1 (attacks outside VMs), 0,54% for the attacks in class 2
(VM as attack target) and 86,5% for attacks in class 3 (VM
as attack source), see Fig. 2.
Most vulnerabilities in hypervisors are exploited to
achieve hypervisor DoS attacks, VM-escape and attacks
targeting the cloud management. Attacks that target VMs
from outside the environment are not proper to cloud
infrastructures while inter-VM attacks are not yet suffi-
ciently studied [37].
From the considered CVEs, Fig. 3 shows the proportion
of exploited vulnerabilities for DoS attacks over the last six
years.
The higher percentage are observed for vulnerabili-
ties arising from the system design which are the most
exploited by attackers to realize DoS attacks against the
hypervisor. Other attacks that exploit hardware issues or
hypercall-handling flaws are harder to perform as they
require certain administrator privileges or additional stag-
ing steps.
Economic aspect
IaaS cloud computing offers the possibility of cost sav-
ing and optimized and efficient computing, following
provider’s policies and contracted agreements in which
the user only pays for resources that are consumed by
his deployed VMs[51]. However, the security threats by
attacks involving the VMs can lead to financial harm and
impacts for both the user and provider. In IaaS clouds,
DoS and DDoS constitute the most common attacks and
“largest threat”[51]. According to a survey [52], these
attacks cost to small-to-medium sized organizations an
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Fig. 3 Vulnerabilities exploited for hypervisor DoS
average of $52000 per incident, while $444,000 for larger
enterprises. An additional cost to the cloud provider is the
penalties negotiated with users, which are due whenever
a certain Quality-of-Service (QoS) constraint specified in
the SLAs is not fulfilled [51].
For the cloud customer, Economic Denial of Sustain-
ability (EDoS) is a type of DoS attacks proper to cloud
environments [53]. It usually takes the form of Fraudulent
Resource Consumption (FRC) where the attacker’s goal
is to cause considerable financial loss to its victim. For
example, the victim VM continuously sends requests that
consume bandwidth and causes consequent billings to its
owner [9].
Both the cloud provider and the cloud user should
implement cost effective solutions that reduce the risk of
security breaches. Cloud providers invest in security mea-
surements including prevention software (e.g., antivirus
software) and hardware, and IT security employees to
prevent security threats. In case of malware attack, the
financial damages to the cloud provider include the cost
of working hours for analyzing, repairing and disinfect-
ing the systems and the losses in productivity and revenue
[54]. Furthermore, the long-term damage in the provider’s
reputation needs to be considered: if the breach is publicly
announced it can be a deterrent for future customers.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a classification of malware
attacks in IaaS cloud environments. We defined the cloud
scenario in which external entities, the VMs and the cloud
provider can be both source and target of attacks. Our
approach takes into consideration the origin and target
of attacks to distinguish three different classes: attacks
that take place outside a VM, attacks targeting VMs and
attacks originating from VMs. A common characteris-
tic of attacks in the second and third class is that they
can be addressed using adequately deployed VMI-based
techniques. Therefore, we added a focus on attacks that
directly involve VMs as both source and target of attacks.
Our classification supports practitioners at early stage of
the design of VMI-based mitigation mechanisms by iden-
tifying relevant attacks which threaten their VM or by
which it can harm co-located VMs.
A statistical analysis of CVE reports on popular virtu-
alization products highlighted how most vulnerabilities
allow attackers to exploit flaws in the product design,
especially to achieve DoS attacks which, from economic
perspective, remain the most damaging attack and most




2Unless mentioned as malicious adversary, we dot not




4All CVE details are found at http://www.cvedetails.
com/
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